In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical …scal policy. In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical …scal policy, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. In line with existing literature, we con…rm the role of increased …nancial integration and lower output volatility in reducing overall procyclicality. In this paper, however, we focus on the role played by the quality of institutions. Indeed, the quality of institutions seems to be a key determinant of a country's ability to graduate. We provide a formal analysis, controlling for the endogeneity of institutions and other determinants of …scal procyclicality, that strongly suggests that there is a causal link running from stronger institutions to less procyclical or more countercyclical …scal policy.
Introduction
The cyclical behavior of …scal policy di¤ers across countries by income group. In the past, while industrial countries have tended to pursue …scal policy that is countercyclical or at worst acyclical, developing countries have tended to follow procyclical …scal policy: they have increased spending (or cut taxes) during periods of expansion and cut spending (or raised taxes) during periods of recession.
Many authors have documented that …scal policy has tended to be more procyclical in developing countries than industrialized countries. 1 Most studies look at the procyclicality of government spending, because tax receipts are endogenous with respect to the business cycle. Indeed, an important reason for procyclical spending is precisely that government receipts from taxes or mineral royalties rise in booms, and the government cannot resist the temptation or political pressures to increase spending proportionately, or even more than proportionately. A similar procyclical pattern can be found on the tax side by focusing on tax rates rather than revenues, though cross-country evidence is harder to come by. Vegh and Vuletin (2012a) …nd that tax rate policy has been mostly procyclical in developing countries and acyclical in industrialized countries.
In terms of government spending, the contrast between the two groups of countries can be clearly seen in Figure 1 , which updates evidence presented in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) . The …gure depicts the correlation between (the cyclical components of) government spending and GDP for 94 countries (21 developed and 73 developing countries) for the period 1960-2009. Black bars represent industrial countries while light bars represent developing countries. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) government spending. 2 The visual image tells the whole story: light bars lie overwhelmingly on the right hand side (positive correlations) while black bars dominate the left hand side (negative correlations). Indeed, more than 90 percent of developing countries (67 out of 73) show procyclical government spending, while around 80 percent of industrial countries (17 1 See Gavin and Perotti (1997) , Tornell and Lane (1999) , Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) , Talvi and Vegh (2005) , Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) , Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) , and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) . 2 Needless to say, correlations do not tell us anything about causality which, in principle, could go in either direction. Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) , however, show that, even when properly instrumented, output does cause government spending, as emphasized by the …scal procyclicality literature.
2 out of 21) show countercyclical government spending.
Why would policymakers pursue procyclical …scal policy? After all, such policy cannot be optimal since it will tend to reinforce the business cycle, exacerbating booms and aggravating busts. The most convincing explanations in the literature fall in two, not necessarily inconsistent, camps: (i) imperfect access to international credit markets and lack of …nancial depth (Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi, 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Riascos and Vegh, 2003; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004) and (ii) political distortions (Velasco, 1997; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Talvi and Vegh, 2005) . 3 Lack of access to credit markets in bad times will naturally leave governments with no choice but to cut spending and raise taxes, whereas political pressures for additional spending in good times are hard to resist, particularly when there may exist a genuine need for more government spending in critical social areas. Improving access to credit in bad times (including o¢ cial …nancial assistance from multilateral …nancial institutions such as the IMF) and designing rules and institutions that aim at ensuring that …scal revenues are saved in good times so that they are available in bad times would go a long way to alleviate the scourge of procyclical …scal policy.
In fact -and as we will argue in this paper -over the last decade several developing countries have been able to "graduate" in the sense of overcoming the problem of procyclicality and becoming countercyclical. 4 Theoretical work by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Nakata (2011) clearly suggests that this shift in the cyclical properties of …scal policy is welfare improving since the optimal …scal policy in a stochastic model with sticky prices is countercycical. 5 Intuitively, suppose the economy is hit systematically (in a stochastic sense) by, say, shocks to the discount factor. In bad times (when the preference shock induces household to save more), it becomes optimal for the government to increase spending (even to the point of making the zero bound marginally non-binding if it was binding to begin with). 6 Chile is undoubtedly the poster child of this graduation movement. As discussed in Frankel (2012) , since 2001 Chile has followed a …scal rule that has a structural (i.e., cyclically-adjusted) …scal balance as its target. 7 By construction, such a rule ensures that temporarily high …scal revenues are saved rather than spent. But, as we will show below, Chile is not the only country that seems to have escaped the procyclicality trap. Our analysis con…rms previous …ndings in the literature regarding the role of increased …nancial integration and lower output volatility in reducing …scal procyclicality.
The paper's main focus, however, is on the role played by the quality of institutions. We argue that the quality of institutions seems to be a key determinant of a country's ability to graduate and show evidence that illustrates the idea that as the quality of institutions increases over time, the level of procyclicality falls.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows the shift in …scal policy in many emerging and developing countries over the last decade. Section 3 traces this shift to the quality of institutions and presents some basic regressions that establish a negative correlation between …scal procyclicality and the quality of institutions. Moreover, we show that a marked improvement in institutional quality witnessed during the last 25 years in some developing countries seems to be at the root of their "graduation." Sections 4 and 5 go a step further and control for other determinants of procyclicality and address endogeneity concerns. We show that there is a strong case to be made that causality indeed runs from the quality of institutions to less procyclical or countercyclical …scal policy. Concluding remarks can be found in Section 6. In sum, the evidence suggests that about a third of the developing world (24 out of 73 countries) has recently "graduated" from procyclicality.
Graduating class
The evidence of countercyclicality among many emerging market and developing countries matches up with other criteria for judging maturity in the conduct of …scal policy: debt-GDP ratios, rankings by rating agencies, and sovereign spreads. Low income and emerging market countries in the aggregate 5 have achieved debt-GDP levels around 40 percent of GDP over the last four years. The IMF estimates the 2011 ratio at 43 percent among emerging market countries and 35 percent among low-income countries. This is the same period during which debt in advanced countries has risen from about 70 per cent of GDP to 102 percent. The …nancial markets have rati…ed the historic turnaround. Spreads are now lower for many emerging markets than for some "advanced countries." As of early 2012, Singapore has a higher credit rating than France or the US; Chile has a higher credit rating than Japan; Korea and China have higher credit ratings than Spain; Malaysia, South Africa, Brazil, and Thailand all have higher ratings than Italy; Colombia has a higher rating than Iceland or Ireland;
Indonesia and the Philippines have higher ratings than Portugal; and various African countries have higher ratings than Greece.
Largely as a result of their improved …scal situations during the period 2000-2007, many emerging markets were able to bounce back from the 2008-2009 global …nancial crisis more quickly than advanced countries. 8 
Graduation and institutional quality
What explains the ability of some countries, particularly emerging market and developing countries, to escape the trap of procyclical …scal policy? Many researchers have pointed to the importance of institutions in determining various aspects of public policy. 9 In this spirit, this section shows that institutional quality (IQ) explains some of the most recent changes in cyclicality of …scal policy. To this e¤ect, we construct an index of IQ by calculating the average of four normalized variables from the International Country Risk Guide dataset: Investment pro…le: An assessment of factors a¤ecting investment risk that are not covered by other political, economic and …nancial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: contract viability/expropriation, pro…ts repatriation, and payment delays.
Corruption: An assessment of corruption within the political system. Law and order: An assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the popular observance of the law.
Bureaucratic quality: An assessment of the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.
The IQ index ranges between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality).
We …rst establish a link between the four way classi…cation in Figure 4 and IQ. To this e¤ect, Column 1 in Table 1 reports the average IQ for each of these groups. As hypothesized, the highest IQ is for the "established graduates" group. Next is the "back to school" group with an average index of 0.6, followed by the "recent graduates" group with an average index of 0.55. The "still in school" countries have the lowest institutional quality (0.48). All these IQ di¤erences are statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level.
We then construct a scatter plot relating IQ and procyclicality, shown in Figure 5 . We can see a clear negative relationship between IQ and cyclicality of …scal policy. The higher (lower) the IQ in a country, the more countercyclical (procyclical) is …scal policy. Based on the estimated regression, an IQ level of 0.79 supports acyclicality. A higher (lower) level of IQ supports countercyclicality (procyclicality).
In order to further explore the importance of IQ in the process of graduation from procyclicality, we decompose IQ values in each country into two components; IQ initial and IQ. IQ initial refers to the initial (or earliest) IQ observed. In most countries this value corresponds to the IQ level in 1984. 10 IQ is then de…ned as the di¤erence between the current IQ value and IQ initial . In other words, IQ IQ IQ initial . Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 show the average IQ initial and IQ for each of these groups. We should take the …ndings for the "back to school" group with a grain of salt given the small sample included in this group; only 8 countries (see top-left quadrant in Figure  4 ). Column 2 shows that, as expected, the highest initial IQ (0.84) is for the "established graduates" group. Mean tests support the idea that initial IQ for "established graduates" is statistically higher than for the other graduating categories at the 1 percent level. "Still in school"and "recent graduates"
have initial IQ values that are statistically indistinguishable from each other. Column 3 of Table 1 shows that "established graduates" have the highest IQ inertia; i.e., lowest IQ values in absolute terms. Moreover, this group has seen a slight decline in IQ in recent times. On the other hand, "recent graduates"is the group with the highest recent increase in IQ. Mean tests support the idea that IQ for "recent graduates" is statistically higher than for the other graduating categories at the 1 percent level. To sum up, "established graduates"have the highest initial IQ and show no major improvements over time. Both "still in school" and "recent graduates" share similar initial IQ conditions. However, the increase in IQ recently observed is much higher in "recent graduates" than the one observed in "still in school."
Although one thinks of institutions as slow-moving, they can change over time. necessarily enforced and are not necessarily credible. Rules can even worsen the general tendency of governments to make overly optimistic forecasts for economic growth and budget balance. 11 Chile's key innovation was to give responsibility for forecasting to independent expert commissions, insulated from politicians'wishful thinking. Its approach could be emulated by others.
Finally, we use panel data regressions to exploit within-country variability as opposed to crosscountry variability. Table 2 , column 1 shows the estimates for 2 and 3 when estimating the following equation
where g c and y c are the cyclical components of government spending and output. Our main result continues to hold: an increase in IQ reduces the degree of procyclicality. In line with our crosscountry regression (see Figure 5 ), we …nd an IQ threshold of 0.79 for graduation. Our results do not change when we allow each coe¢ cient in equation (1) to vary by graduating class, as reported in Columns 2a-2d. The only case for which our main results are not supported is for "established graduates."This is mainly due to the small sample (15 countries) and, more importantly, to the small within-country variability of IQ described before for this set of countries.
We now decompose the variable IQ into its initial value IQ initial , which is constant over time,
and IQ, which varies over time. Table 2 , column 3 shows the estimates for 2 , 3 and 4 when estimating the following equation
The underlying idea is to …nd out whether it is the highly inertial/static component of IQ that graduating class, as reported in Columns 4a-4d. Some interesting asymmetries emerge between the "still in school" and "recent graduate" categories. Column 4b indicates that for the "still in school" group, historical factors dominate. This is consistent with very static IQ measures (compared to those of "recent graduates") during the last 25 years. Instead, for the"recent graduates" group, it is the more recent change in IQ (i.e.., IQ) that seems to be mainly driving the results. This suggests that changes in IQ are an important determinant of graduation.
Our analysis so far has suggested that IQ is an important determinant of procyclical …scal policy. In particular, we have put forward the notion that about a third of developing countries have graduated from …scal procyclicality due to important improvements in IQ during the last decades. Our analysis, however, could su¤er from both omitted variables and endogeneity problems. The next two sections address these concerns.
Other determinants of cyclicality
While it seems natural to think that institutions a¤ect the way in which …scal policy is conducted, our …ndings so far could re ‡ect the e¤ect of omitted variables that are related to institutions. To address this concern, we include in our panel regressions three sets of control variables aimed at capturing alternative theories regarding cyclicality of …scal policy.
First, we control for the degree of …nancial integration and depth. Among others, Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997) , and Riascos and Vegh (2003) have argued that limited access to international capital markets (particularly in bad times) may limit the ability of governments to pursue countercyclical policies. In the same spirit, Caballero and Krishnamurthy ). 12 The panel data correlation between the Chinn-Ito …nancial openness index and IQ is 0.55; the panel data correlation between liquid liabilities and IQ is 0.53. Table 3 , columns 2 and 3 show that more …nancial integration and depth are indeed associated with more countercyclicality/less procyclicality.
Second, we control for the variability of tax revenues -proxied by output variability -to account for the channel emphasized by Talvi and Vegh (2005) who argue that, in the presence of political distortions, the larger is the variability of tax revenues the more procyclical …scal policy will be, as policymakers try to reduce the …scal surplus in good times to prevent wasteful spending. We measure output variability using the square of the cyclical component of real GDP. 13 Table 3 , column 4 shows that, as in Lane (2003), higher output volatility does indeed increase the degree of procyclicality of …scal policy.
Third, we address political economy arguments that stress common pool problems and fragmented policymaking (Velasco, 1997; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Perotti, 2000) . For these purposes, we use a measure of political checks and balances from the Database on Political institutions. 14 Stronger checks and balances constrain politicians in their policy space. Politicians are also held more accountable to the public, relative to an autocratic regime. In a more democratic regime the expected returns to rent-seeking activities are lower. Table 3 , column 5 shows that stronger checks and balances decrease the degree of procyclicality of …scal policy.
We also test whether debt-GDP ratios and foreign reserves holdings (in months of imports) matters for …scal behavior over the business cycle. Recent low debt-GDP ratios and massive foreign reserves in emerging markets may have contributed to reduce those countries default risk, allowing them to run countercyclical …scal policies. Table 3 , columns 6 and 7 support these presumptions. 
Addressing endogeneity
This section addresses potential endogeneity problems. One could argue that the observed negative relationship between …scal policy cyclicality and IQ may re ‡ect the fact that countercyclical (procyclical) …scal policies that tend to stabilize (destabilize) the economy might improve (worsen) institutional quality. That is to say, the causality may run from cyclicality of …scal policies to institutional quality and not the other way around. For example, procyclical …scal policies could increase the chances of governments running into debt sustainability problems during busts. These critical …nancing needs could then lead to expropriation, repudiation of contracts, and/or intervention in independent branches of governments such as the judiciary system or the central bank. Moreover, the turmoil typically associated with debt crises can exacerbate corruption in the political system thus weakening the foundations of an e¢ cient and professional public administration. Similar arguments could also be made regarding the endogeneity of the control variables included in Section 4. For example, one could argue that it is procyclical …scal policies that ultimately increase output volatility instead of the latter being the cause of procyclical …scal policies.
We address such endogeneity concerns by instrumenting not only for IQ but also for the other six control variables. We instrument …nancial integration and depth using legal origin (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), output volatility using terms of trade volatility, and debt-GDP ratio using debt-GDP ratio in 1900. We instrument checks and balances using constraints on the executive and Table 4 shows the cross-country correlations between all pairs of variables used in the analysis.
With the exeption of foreign reserves, the …ndings support our panel data regressions results reported above in that higher IQ, …nancial integration and depth, and checks and balances are associated with countercyclicality, and higher output volatility and debt-GDP ratios are related to procyclicality.
Instruments are also correlated as expected, both among themselves and with the variables they will be instrumenting for. far in the paper as well as for the smaller sample of 52 countries that will be used in our instrumental variables regressions.
Two results are worth noting. First, with the exception of foreign reserves and debt-GDP ratios, cross-country regressions support our panel data regression …ndings. That is to say, higher IQ, …nancial integration and depth, and checks and balances increase countercyclicality and output volatility increases procyclicality. Second, the results obtained for the sample of 94 countries also hold for the smaller sample of countries that will be used in our instrumental variables regressions. Columns 15 and 16 include all control variables together. As in our panel regressions, institutional quality is strongly signi…cant in all cases.
Next, we address endogeneity problems. Having checked that the proposed instruments seem to be good predictors for the variables they are instrumenting for, we proceed to estimate instrumental variables regressions. Table 7 shows the corresponding regressions. Columns 1 to 7 only instrument for IQ. Column 1 only includes IQ as regressor. Columns 2 to 7 sequencially adds other determinents. In all cases we cannot reject the overidenti…cation tests. The instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. As suggested in Table 6 , all instrumental variable regressions con…rm that the excluded instruments are not weak instruments (i.e., they are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors). We thus conclude that institutional quality remains a critical determinant of procyclicality even after accounting for possible endogeneity problems.
Finally, the regression shown in Table 7 , column 8, corrects for the endogeneity of the rest of the right-hand variables. IQ remains strongly negatively related to the cyclicality of …scal policy con…rming that there is a strong causal link running from better institutions to less procyclical/more countercyclical …scal policy.
Conclusions
We have shown that, over the past decade, a substantial number of emerging and developing countries have "graduated" from …scal procyclicality in the sense of being able to shift from procyclical to countercyclical …scal policy. Further, we have argued that a critical determinant of whether a country has been able to graduate or not is institutional quality. We have formally linked the degree of …scal procyclicality to institutional quality and shown that, even when correcting for endogeneity and other determinants, there is a strong causal link running from better institutions to less procyclical/more countercyclical …scal policy.
While institutional change is certainly not easy and often occurs only slowly over time, the payo¤ in terms of enabling countries to escape the …scal procyclicality trap can be large. Chile is perhaps the best example of a country that has succeeded in developing stronger …scal institutions over time and, as result, has been able to conduct countercyclical …scal policy over the last decade. This graduation process, however, can be a long and arduous road and does require clear economic leadership and a strong political consensus.
[ [41] Velasco, Andrés, 1997, "A model of endogenous …scal de…cits and delayed …scal reforms," NBER working paper N 6336. Notes: Institutional quality is a normalized index that ranges between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality). IQ refers to the current institutional quality value. Estimations are performed using country-fixed-effects. t-statistics are in square brackets. R 2 corresponds to within-R 2 . Constant, IQ, financial integration, financial depth, output volatility, checks and balances, debt-gdp ratio, and foreign reserves terms are not reported. ˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Notes: See Appendix 1 for definition and source of variables. t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant term is not reported. ˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Appendix 1. Definition of variables and sources
Av. IQ -1.39*** -1.31*** -1.43*** -1.27*** -1.32*** -1.44*** -1.51*** - Instrumenting only for Av. IQ Notes: See Appendix 1 for definition and source of variables. t-statistics are in square brackets. The weak-identification test is the first-stage F test of excluded instruments; the null hypothesis is that the model is weakly identified (i.e., the excluded instruments have a nonzero correlation with the endogenous regressors but small). The over-identification test is the Hansen's J statistic; the null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). Constant term is not reported. ˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
